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Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional 
Developments in South and Southeast Asia 
 
 
 
DIANE A. DESIERTO* 
 
 
The development of international law in South and Southeast Asia 
exemplifies myriad ideological strands, historical origins, and significant 
contributions to contemporary international law doctrines’ formative and 
codification processes.  From the beginnings of South and Southeast Asian 
participation in the international legal order, international law discourse from 
these regions has been thematically postcolonial and substantively 
development-oriented.  Postcolonialism in South and Southeast Asian 
conceptions of international law is an ongoing dialectical project of re-
visioning international legal thought and its normative directions --- towards 
identifying, collocating, and applying South and Southeast Asian values and 
philosophical traditions alongside the Euro-American ideologies that, since 
the classical Post-Westphalian era, have largely infused the content of 
positivist international law.1  Of increasing necessity to the intricacies of the 
postmodern international legal system and its institutions is how the 
postcolonial project of South and Southeast Asian international legal 
discourse focuses on areas of international law that create the most urgent 
                                                 
* Law Reform Specialist, Institute of International Legal Studies, University of 
the Philippines Law Center; Professorial Lecturer (Public International Law, Legal 
History, Administrative Law, Agency & Partnership), Lyceum of the Philippines 
College of Law and University of the Philippines College of Law; BS Economics, 
summa cum laude, University of the Philippines; LLB, cum laude, University of the 
Philippines; LLM Candidate, Yale Law School, 2008-2009.  With deep gratitude to 
Teresa Miguel (Librarian for Foreign and International Law, Lillian Goldman Law 
Library, Yale Law School) for valuable research exchanges. 
1 Arif Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories:  The Past as Legacy and Project 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000) 63-89; RP Anand, Studies in 
International Law and History:  An Asian Perspective (Brill Academic Publishers, 
Massachussetts USA 2004) 24-102; David Fidler, ‘The Asian Century:  Implications 
for International Law’, (2005) 9 SYBIL 19-35; Nicholas Onuf, “Tainted by 
Contingency’:  Retelling the Story of International Law” in Richard Falk, Lester 
Edwin J. Ruiz, and RBJ Walker (eds), Reframing the International:  Law, Culture, 
Politics (Routledge, New York, 2002).  See also Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
“The Idea of ‘International System’:  Theory Meets History”, (1994) International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 231-255. 
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development consequences:  trade, investment, and the international 
economic order; the law of the sea and the environment; international 
humanitarian law, self-determination, socio-economic and cultural human 
rights.2   
The nature and extent of the engagement with international law, 
however, differs for each region.  South Asian international law literature 
reflects a longer historical engagement with the development of international 
law from antiquity to postcolonialism.  The development of certain principles 
of modern international law, such as immunities, diplomatic protocol, the 
conclusion of treaties, maritime principles on freedom of commerce and 
navigation and the high seas regime, have been attributed to Asian-European 
interactions from the 16th to 18th centuries,3 where the most prominent Asian 
countries that came into contact with European powers during this period 
were the Mughal Empire in India, the Maratha State in India, the Kingdoms of 
Burma and Ceylon, Indonesian states, among others.4  Specifically, India’s 
ancient civilization was a veritable source of rules on inter-state conduct, from 
the laws of war, the law of treaties, the right of asylum, the treatment of aliens 
and foreign nationals, the modes of acquiring territory, and rules on 
navigation and inter-state trade.5   
At the same time during this period, positivist international law (as it 
was then crystallizing as a concrete ideological discipline in Europe) was 
being grounded on the “development of the Family of Nations based entirely 
on [positivists’] own 19th century ideology and doctrine which they tended to 
project backwards into the past as if the past had not had its own ideology and 
legal doctrine.”6  During this period, classical positivist international law 
would emerge as a “self-contained system...with an ideology of its own”, 
where international lawyers and scholars occupied a central role in taking up 
                                                 
2 SK Agrawala (tr), TS Rama Rao and JN Saxena, New Horizons of International 
Law and Developing Countries (N.M. Tripathia Private Limited, 1983); Sienho Yee, 
‘The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in Human Rights and 
Regional Systems for the Protection of Human Rights:  The European and Asian 
Models as Illustrations’ (2004) 8 SYBIL 157-164. 
3 CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the 
East Indies (16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries), (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967).   
4 CH Alexandrowicz, The Afro-Asian States and International Law, Recueil de 
Cours, Vol. 123 (1968), 124. 
5 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India, (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2005) 1-5, 29-30, 39-40, 54-55, 108-
109, 121-130. 
6 Id. at note 5, at 125. 
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the task of codifying and legitimating the law of nations.7  The eventual 
dominance of classical positivist international law, and the ensuing power 
asymmetries in the international legal order, would have critical implications 
on the modes of legal justification articulated to exculpate the European 
powers from their treatment of India and other ancient Asian states during the 
colonization era. 
Southeast Asian international legal scholarship, on the other hand, is 
deemed of more recent vintage, accounted for by long suppression or 
inhibition as a consequence of the power relations and political structures 
endemic to the colonization period,8 and, unlike the ancient Indian civilization 
in South Asia, is marked by the fairly recent emergence of Southeast Asian 
states in the postmodern international legal system.9  While possessing some 
common religio-cultural dimensions, the numerous Southeast Asian states 
represent a full spectrum of political, legal, and ideological diversity that 
veers away from the typical homogeneity of most regional groupings.10  The 
concept of ‘Southeast Asia’ is itself an artificial construct, made “almost by 
accident, from World War II, when, at the Quebec Conference in August 
1943, the Western Allies decided to establish a separate South East Asia 
Command (SEAC), embracing Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, and Thailand.”11  
The pervasiveness of this diversity has made stamping a ‘Southeast Asian’ 
mark on international law a polemical process of apprehending and 
reconciling diverse bases of authority and legal orders.    
Southeast Asian law has been described as an “accretion of layers of 
law and legal culture, as distinct from a mere progression from one 
                                                 
7 Id. at note 5, at 126.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:  
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 
United Kingdom, 2002). 
8 For the seminal work on colonialism’s operative effects on positivist 
conceptions of international law, see Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries:  
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’ (1999) 40 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 1-80; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
9 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of 
Globalization’, (2001) 5 SJICL 284-313; Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45-111. 
10 ASEAN Law Association, ASEAN Legal Systems (Butterworths Asia, 1995); 
Carmelo V. Sison and Roshan T. Jose (trs), Constitutional and Legal Systems of the 
ASEAN Countries (University of the Philippines, 1990). 
11 Kevin YL Tan, ‘The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia:  
An Overview’, (2002) 6 SJICL 1-41. 
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conception of law to another,” where “...every kind of religious or secular law 
or source of law; every kind of dispute-resolution process; every kind of 
constitution and law-making process; with a few extra ones arising out of the 
incessant problems of legal conflicts, has been evidenced in South East Asia.  
Every kind of legal ‘reception’ has occurred.  In most of Southeast Asia, and 
all of maritime Southeast Asia, many of these traditions have lived side-by-
side in a kind of pluralistic abandon.”12 
The differences in ideological development of international law in 
South and Southeast Asia are not coincidental, and should be understood 
against the broader context of pre-modern to postmodern Asian participation 
in the international legal order.13  Asian contributions to international law and 
membership in international institutions have been as numerous, diverse and 
widespread as the region’s composite states. Among many contemporary 
international law doctrines, Asia has proposed and/or authored concepts such 
as the Exclusive Economic Zone, the establishment of international 
machinery to govern sea-bed regimes beyond national jurisdiction, principles 
on decolonization and the right to self-determination, the rights of indigenous 
peoples and other socio-economic rights, among others.14  South and 
Southeast Asian states, in particular, have frequently sought international 
adjudication over contested territorial sovereignty and/or maritime issues, as 
seen most recently from the International Court of Justice’ 23 May 2008 
Judgment in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. 15  
Asian participation in the international legal system also shows both 
vertical and horizontal legalization, as well as deepening and widening 
commitments, of the state and non-state actors, especially international 
                                                 
12 Andrew Harding, “Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East 
Asia:  Making Sense of the ‘Nomic Din” in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), 
Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland Oregon, 2001). 
13 See Allah Bukhsh Karim Bukhsh Brohi (ed), Five Lectures on Asia and the 
United Nations (Recueil de Cours, Volume 102, 1968). 
14 T.O. Elias, New Horizons in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1992) 29-43.   
15 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle 
Rocks, and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore) [2008] ICJ Rep  130; See Case 
Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. 
Malaysia) [2002] ICJ Rep; Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia 
v. Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6.  See also Hisashi Owada, ‘The Experience of Asia 
with International Adjudication’ (2005) 9 SYBIL 9-18. 
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organizations in the region.16 The overall pattern of these many circumstances 
of Asian engagement of international law would evoke critical questions on 
the traditional dominance of (Euro-American) canons and methods of 
positivist international law.17   
Among several “new” theoretical (and usually constructivist18) 
approaches to contemporary international law, the scholarship of Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) drew significant and widespread 
support from South and Southeast Asian countries early on in the postcolonial 
and post-independence period of the twentieth century.  TWAIL is a political-
ideological movement that arose from the landmark 1955 Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia.19 The Bandung conference 
assembled many states that had either regained sovereignty or were newly-
independent,20 and whose Declaration of Principles21 eventually became the 
precursor for the non-alignment and neutrality policies of many South and 
Southeast Asian states.22   
TWAIL advances a distinct critique of, and alternative narratives 
from, mainstream international legal scholarship by making various 
challenges to the morality of the international legal order, as when it: “1) uses 
                                                 
16 See Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Institutionalized Legalisation and the Asia-Pacific 
‘Region’, (2007) 5 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int’l L. 9.  
17 See Richard A. Falk, “Is the International Legal Order Eurocentric?” in The 
New States and the International Legal Order, Recueil de Cours, Vol. 118 (1966), 34-
43. 
18 See Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law” in Gerry Simpson 
(ed), The Nature of International Law (Dartmouth Publishing Company, England, 
2001). 
19 RP Anand, “Jawaharlal Nehru and International Law and Relations” in Studies 
in International Law and History: An Asian Perspective (Brill Academic Publishers, 
Massachusetts USA, 2004); Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference, 
Bandung, 24 April 1955, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/asiaafrica/bandung55.pdf 
(last visited 20 October 2008).   
20 Richard A. Falk, The New States and the International Legal Order, Recueil de 
Cours, Volume 118 (1966), 10-25. 
21 See George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 
Indonesia, 1955 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1970). 
22 Sisir K. Gupta, ‘Asian Nonalignment’ (November 1965) 362 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science  44-51; Rajen Harshe, ‘India’s 
Non-Alignment:  An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction’ (February 17-24, 1990) 
25 Economic and Political Weekly, 399-405. 
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colonial history to frame the impact of international law on the South; 2) 
avoids prioritizing the universal above the local; and 3) focuses on the 
interrelation between international capital and non-European cultural 
traditions.”23  In the context of assessing developments in contemporary 
international law, TWAIL raises caution and calls for resistance against re-
colonization that could be facilitated by the changing shape of the postmodern 
international legal system:  “...the meaning of the reconstitution of the 
relationship between State and international law is the creation of fertile 
conditions for the global operation of capital and the promotion, extension, 
and protection of internationalised property rights.  A transnational ruling elite 
has emerged, with the ruling elite of the third world playing a junior role, 
which guides this process.  It is seeking to create a global system of 
governance suited to the needs of transnational capital but to the disadvantage 
of third world peoples.   
The entire ongoing process of redefinition of State sovereignty is 
being justified through the ideological apparatuses of the Northern States and 
international institutions [they] control.”24  TWAIL attempts the critical de-
contextualization of Eurocentrism as the dominant and exclusively 
‘legitimate’ tradition of international law, and calls for sensitivity towards 
international institutions, modalities, and procedures that could possibly 
perpetuate re-colonization through hegemonic subjugation of the emerging 
states in the international legal order.25   
A monolithic approach to characterizing international law in South 
and Southeast Asia therefore does little justice to the regions’ rich diversity 
and complex history. At the same time, however, international legal scholars 
must also be mindful of excessive reliance on history that produces 
                                                 
23 Andrew F. Sunter, ‘TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry’ (2007) 20 
Can. J. L. & Juris. 475, at 487-488; see David P. Fidler, ‘Revolt Against or From 
Within the West?  TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of 
International Law’ (2003) 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 29. 
24 B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto”, in 
Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson, and Obiora Okafor (eds), The 
Third World and International Order:  Law, Politics and Globalization (Brill 
Academic Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2003); Makau Mutua, ‘What is 
TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31-40. 
25 As a theoretical platform for international legal scholarship, however, TWAIL 
has not yet gone beyond the level of pure critique.  It has not provided concrete 
alternatives or viable ‘solutions’ to problems of the modern international system.  See 
B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order:  A Critique of Contemporary 
Approaches (Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California, 1993). 
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“manipulated appearances of reality, while, in fact, alienating the observer 
and simplifying the links between motives, causes, stakes, and outcomes.” 26    
The following discussion of regional developments in South and 
Southeast Asia proposes to begin from the initial acknowledgment that these 
regions’ discursive contributions to modern international law originate from 
separate but parallel paths --- both of which are jointly contoured along theme 
of postcolonialism and the orientation towards development.  South and 
Southeast Asian regional developments in international law are presented 
from within this ideological dichotomy. 
South Asia and International Law 
Uniquely, Indian scholars point to the fundamental international law 
concept of universal applicability of rules as ancient India’s central 
contribution to the modern law of nations.27  Indian perspectives on 
contributions to international law have been traced across four chronological 
periods:   
1. the ancient period (up to 711 AD);  
2. the middle ages (711 to 1600 AD);  
3. the colonial period (1600 to 1947); and  
4. the modern period (1947 onwards).28   
Ancient India was generally composed of small and large kingdoms, 
ruled by monarchs enjoying various degrees of power and prominence (the 
least powerful being a Raja or king, followed by a Maharaja or great king, a 
Samrat or strong emperor, to the most powerful being the Chakravartin or 
emperor who ruled the entire known world).29   The profusion of kingdoms 
and the experience of warfare and internecine conflict in Ancient India led to 
the development of inter-state norms on statehood, diplomatic relations, 
                                                 
26 Outi Korhonen, ‘The Role of History in International Law’ (2000) 94 Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.  45-46. 
27 Nagendra Singh, “India and International Law” in RP Anand (ed), Asian States 
and the Development of Universal International Law (Vikas Publications, Delhi, 
India, 1972). 
28 V.S. Mani, ‘An Indian Perspective on the Evolution of International Law on 
the Threshold of the Third Millenium’ (2000) 9 Asian Y.B. Int’l L. 31-77. 
29 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany 2005), 28-30. 
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treaties, religious tolerance, non-use of force, neutrality and humanitarian 
law.30   
The deeply-embedded practice of these norms of inter-state conduct 
in ancient India, long before the advent of Christianity in the West, challenges 
the prevalent view of international law as ‘mainly rooted in Christian 
civilizations and natural law conceptions’.31 Concepts such as the just war or 
Dharma Yuddha, the unjust war or Adharma Yuddha, the laws applicable to 
all belligerents at all times in the context of warfare or Dharmasastras (which 
included, among others, principles of distinction of targets, proportionality, 
and protection of civilians), collectively show that the application of norms 
based on fundamental considerations of humanity in situations of belligerency 
had long antedated the formal codification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.32  
Inter-state relations in Ancient India were also organized along 
different tiers of statehood, sovereignty, kinship, and within a hierarchy of 
suzerain-vassal relations.33  Ancient India’s trade linkages with China, Arabia, 
Egypt, Greece, Rome and East Africa necessitated protocols and rules on 
diplomatic relations and the creation of various Superintendents for 
Commerce, Ships, and Passports, while various Indian states furthered inter-
state diplomatic relations by establishing special missions in each other’s 
capitals.  Treaties were recognized to be of a binding character depending on 
the nature of the treaty and the security of its performance, a practice that 
arguably presaged the notion of “unequal treaties” in international law.34   
The use of force to settle conflicts with other states, previously an 
axis of state policy, was formally renounced by Emperor Asoka during the 
Maurya Dynasty, leading to imperial India’s policy of non-use of force and 
neutrality.35  These policies, coupled with the spread of Ancient India’s 
largely Hindu and Buddhist religions, became instrumental in the pacifist 
establishment of colonies in Southeast Asia (the Sri Vijaya empire in Sumatra 
                                                 
30 Id. at note 19. 
31 Id.; see Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When Was the Law of International Society Born?  
An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational 
Perspective’ (2000) 2 J. Hist. Int’l L. 1. 
32 Id. at note 16. 
33 Id. at note 19, at 34. 
34 Id. at note 2; see Ingrid Detter, ‘The Problem of Unequal Treaties’ (1966) 15 
Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 1069-1089. 
35 Id. at note 19, at 38-41. 
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and Java, the Kingdom of Kambojadesa in Cambodia, and the thirteen (13) 
dynasties of Champa) from the second century AD onwards.36   
 Beginning with initial raids by Afghanistan’s Sultan Mahmud of 
Ghazni in 991 AD until the consolidation of the Mughal Empire from 1526 to 
1707, the surge of Muslim conquests of India during its medieval era would 
prove crucial for the emergence of norms on religious freedom and basic 
respect for religious diversity.  The juxtaposition of Islam and Hindu beliefs 
in the ever-widening population of ancient Indian empires made harmonious 
inter-religion relations the immediate pragmatic concern of Indian 
governors.37   
As a result of the imperial policy mandating respect for religious 
diversity, Islamic rule under the Mughal Empire was, by and large, peaceable.   
There was continuity in the rules of inter-state conduct towards other Indian 
states, vassals, and ancient Asian trading partners.  The Mughal emperors 
“respected the institutions of embassies, treaties, and laws of peace and war.  
They had a written code of law, applied by their judges, called kazis, which 
regulated relation between state and subjects inter se.  Their notions of 
sovereignty and kingship had been inherited from their predecessors, the 
Hindu empires like the Guptas and the Mauryas, and the Sultanate of Delhi.”38   
Notwithstanding any political changes introduced by the Mughal 
empire in medieval India, however, the European powers did not alter their 
settled practice of dealing with Indian heads of state as sovereigns. Various 
heads of state within the Indian territories functioned under suzerainty 
relations with the Mughal Empire, a political relationship that permitted 
retention of most sovereign rights and administrative prerogatives over their 
respective territories.   
The International Court of Justice recognized this form of suzerain-
vassal relationship in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. 
India),39 where, following a historical examination of the nature and form of 
treaty-making in ancient Indian legal traditions, the Court affirmed the 
                                                 
36 Id. at note 16, at 36-37.  Id. at note 17. 
37 Id. at note 19.  RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and 
India (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 35-40.   
38 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 39. 
39 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ 
Rep 6. 
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sovereign capacity of an Indian ruler (the Peshwa of the Maratha State, a 
vassal of the Mughal empire) to conclude the Treaty of Poona of 1779.  
Rejecting Portugal’s claims of sovereignty over the disputed enclaves of 
Dadra, Nagar, Aveli, and surrounding territories, the narrow Court majority 
upheld the Peshwa’s interpretation of this Treaty, which had granted to the 
Portuguese merely a revenue tenure, or saranjam, and not sovereign rights, 
over such territories. 
The colonial era featured a conceptual ‘division of sovereignty’ by 
European public authorities (British governors of India, for example, would 
organize hundreds of ‘Princely’ or ‘Native States’ that were ‘semi-
sovereign’).  Colonial rule was characterized by the “gradual acquisition of 
prerogatives from indigenous rulers”, initially by publicly-owned state 
enterprises such as the English East India Company, and later on, through 
official imperial administrators from the European states.  While the initial 
motivation of colonialism was mercantilist in nature, this motivation would be 
subsumed within the larger rhetoric of European empires: the (ostensible) 
responsibility to “promote civilization” and “good government” in countries 
that had long been subject of ‘indigenous’ rule.40 In this manner, the core 
international law principle of respect for sovereign states degenerated into an 
antithetical selectivity and arbitrariness of states deemed ‘deserving’ of 
sovereignty by other, more powerful states.41  One scholar describes this 
colonialist notion of sovereignty as “a part of the relevant neo-absolutist 
concept prevailing in Europe at the time... [where] a metropolitan state 
possessed ‘absolute sovereignty’ over its colonies and nothing bound it in its 
relations with colonized peoples when it established the order and content of 
these relations solely at its own discretion.”42 
The establishment and entrenchment of British colonial rule in India 
was patently illegal for subverting the fundamental international legal doctrine 
of equality of states, but was seemingly justified under international law 
principles that recognized the use of force or conquest as a legitimate basis for 
                                                 
40 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and 
Order in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002), 76-96. 
41 RP Anand, “Equality of States in an Unequal World:  A Historical 
Perspective”, in Sovereign Equality of States, Recueil de Cours, Vol. 197 (1986), 52-
100. 
42 Christos Theodoropoulos, Colonialism and General International Law:  The 
Contemporary Theory of National Sovereignty and Self-determination (New Horizon 
Publishing House, Benin, Nigeria, 1988), 23.  See also Lauren Benton, Law and 
Colonial Cultures (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002), 1-30. 
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acquisition of territory.43   The British annexation of India began innocuously 
with trade monopolies held by the English East India Company, which, after 
various historical intermediations by British officials and (forced) 
capitulations by Indian rulers, eventually led to the acquisition and 
administration of Indian territories by the English East India Company under 
the 1657 Cromwell Charter, and over two centuries later, to the 1858 Queen’s 
Proclamation and Act of Parliament that formally declared British takeover of 
the government of India, with British Queen Victoria being formally 
proclaimed ‘Empress of India’ in 1876.  
The unjust and unlawful displacement of Indian sovereigns by British 
imperial rulers repudiated the settled pre-colonization European practice, 
where, as a renowned Indian international law scholar observed, “...non-
Christian states enjoyed full sovereignty and exercised the right of sending 
and receiving ambassadors.  Such views had earlier been expressed by Jean 
Bodin, and were later endorsed by Hugo Grotius in his famous Mare Liberum, 
published in 1609.  Nobody ever questioned the right of the Indian states to 
make war or peace, conclude treaties, send embassies, or exercise their 
sovereign jurisdiction within their territories.  Grotius accepted and 
recognized the sovereign status of the Indian rulers although they were 
‘infidels’, and argued that Portugal had no right over them on account of their 
religious beliefs.  No constitutive theory of recognition existed before the 
nineteenth century...the Indian rulers acted as sovereign entities, made war 
and peace, concluded treaties, and exchanged embassies.  The European 
countries participated with them without questioning their legal status.”44  The 
imperial design of colonialism thus exposed the failure of international law at 
the time to abide by its objective of attaining universal applicability to all 
peoples of humanist aspirations and humanitarian rules of conduct.45 
There were many ideological and conceptual consequences from the 
forcible imposition of European legal institutions and international law 
traditions on India during the colonial period.  Long before European 
                                                 
43 Id. at note 19.  Id. at note 20, pp. 65-69.  See Island of Palmas case 
(Netherlands v. USA), 4 April 1928,  II RIAA 829-871, at 839.  Full text available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf (last visited 20 October 
2008). 
44 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 54-55. 
45 Peter Fitzpatrick, “Terminal Legality:  Imperialism and the (de)composition of 
Law” in Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, Law, History, Colonialism:  The 
Reach of Empire (Manchester University Press, United Kingdom, 2001). 
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colonialism made its appearance, many Asian sovereign peoples had already 
established and were already practicing international maritime principles such 
as “freedom of the seas, the rules of flag state jurisdiction on the seas, 
superior coastal state jurisdiction over all ships while near the coast, 
prohibition of piracy, the rules of charter-party, customs and tolls, permits of 
entry and departure, and even some rules relating to contraband.”46   
Neither of these practices, nor India’s participation in the 
international legal order, would be substantially altered or dissolved in the 
period of colonization.  Instead, British India would be treated as a “separate 
State, with an international legal personality of its own.  It was a member of 
the League of Nations.  It became party to the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of Justice and the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1928.  
It entered into treaties and ratified them.  It had the dubious distinction of 
being the only country that ratified the 1937 Geneva Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which the UK and other countries 
did not ratify.  British India also participated in the San Francisco Conference 
that led to the establishment of the United Nations.”47  India’s position from 
1919 to 1947 would be that of an “anomalous international person”, 
exercising some powers of self-governance yet devoid of the full attributes of 
statehood since control of internal and external relations still remained with 
the British Government and its Parliament.48 
British India’s possession of limited international legal personality 
under British rule necessarily made the Indian normative system susceptible 
to the influences of classical positivist international law.  British judges in 
several pre-independence cases in India would apply classical positivist (and 
necessarily Eurocentric) principles of international law as part of the Indian 
legal system.  The result was that “...early in the history of India, the Common 
Law principle that international law is part of the law of the land became a 
part of India’s legacy.”49  This principle, along with the concept of the rule of 
                                                 
46 Id. at note 18, at 56. 
47 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, “The Indian Position on Some General Principles 
of International Law”, in Bimal N. Patel (ed), India and International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2005).   
48 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India(Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 78-84. 
49 M.S. Nawaz, The Changing Law of Nations:  An Indian Focus (Eastern Law 
House, Calcutta, India, 2000), 7-9.  See also S.K. Agarwala, India’s Contribution to 
the Development of International Law --- the Role of Indian Courts, in RP Anand 
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law, would have significant influences on the growth and direction of 
international law in India.  Similar to the experiences of other colonial states, 
the infusion (through doctrines of incorporation and/or treaty transformation) 
of Eurocentric positivist international law norms into would have significant 
impacts on the present-day content and interpretation of South and Southeast 
Asian laws.50   
British Raj (British rule over the Indian subcontinent) would 
terminate in 1947 with the official Partition of the British Indian Empire 
(hereafter, ‘Partition’) into two (2) separate, self-governing, sovereign 
dominions:  the Dominion of Pakistan declared independent on August 14, 
1947 (and whose territory included the territories of present-day Pakistan and 
Bangladesh); and on August 15, 1947, the Union of India (later replaced by 
the Republic of India on January 26, 1950).  The two largest provinces of the 
British Indian Empire, Punjab and Bengal, would be subdivided between the 
Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India.51  
The Partition would also impact British treatment of other South 
Asian states. 52  In parallel with the termination of British Raj over ancient 
Indian territories, Britain would likewise recognize the independence of 
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) as a sovereign Dominion on February 4, 1948.  By 
1972, Sri Lanka would become a full Republic.53  Nepal’s independence, 
which had long been recognized by the United Kingdom in a 1923 friendship 
treaty, was subsequently recognized by the new Dominion of Pakistan and the 
Union of India.  Bhutan, which became a politically-autonomous suzerain of 
the United Kingdom in 1910, was given the choice of joining the Indian 
                                                                                                                    
(ed), Asian States and the Development of International Law (Vikas Publications, 
Delhi, India, 1972). 
50 Id. at note 9.  See Iza Hussin, ‘The Pursuit of Perak Regalia:  Islam, Law, and 
the Politics of Authority in the Colonial State’ (2007) 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 759-
784; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Law and Colonialism’ (1991) 25 Law & Soc’y Rev. 889-
920. 
51 See H.S. Bhatia, Origin and Development of Legal and Political System in 
India (Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, India, 1976); Hamid Khan, 
Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Oxford University Press, United 
Kingdom, 2001). 
52 See Francis Robinson, Islam, South Asia and the West (Oxford University 
Press, United States, 2008); Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia:  
History, Culture, and Political Economy (2nd ed., Routledge, United Kingdom, 2004). 
53 See Francis Robinson (ed), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives (Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom, 1989). 
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Union, but opted for independence.  Both the Dominion of Pakistan and the 
Union of India would eventually extend recognition to fellow South Asian 
states. 
Differences on various constitutional questions, (such as the division 
of power between central government and the provinces, the sufficiency 
representation, and administrative authority) between the majority Islamic 
population and the largely-Hindu Bengali population within Pakistan, coupled 
with Indian support for the Bengali/Bangladeshi liberation movement, would 
provide the impetus for the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 
December 1971.  In 1972, Bangladesh would establish its own parliamentary 
democracy, and thereafter enter into a friendship treaty with India.54 
The terms of the Partition would not sufficiently address competing 
territorial claims of India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the northwestern region 
of the Indian subcontinent that had its own historic, religious, demographic, 
and political linkages with both India and Pakistan.  After the United Nations 
mediated a ceasefire from the 1947 Indo-Pakistani War, the Security Council 
issued Resolution 47 recommending measures to India and Pakistan “to bring 
about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and 
impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to 
accede to India or Pakistan.”55  Such a plebiscite would not be conducted, and 
hostilities would resume in 1965 and 1999, the unsatisfactory conclusion of 
which resulting in the maintenance of Pakistani control of about a third, and 
Indian control of about half, of the disputed territory to date.56 
Another vital international legal question arising from the Partition 
was the issue of succession of India and Pakistan to treaties to which British 
India was a party.57  Pakistan contended that it was a co-successor of India to 
all such treaties, especially the 1928 General Act on the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes (1928 Act), through which Pakistan would invoke the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
54 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession:  Pakistan, India, and the 
Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, California, United States, 
1990). 
55 UNSC Res 47 (21 April 1948) UN Doc/S/RES/726. 
56 See Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects:  Islam, Rights, and the History 
of Kashmir (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, United States 2004); H.S. 
Gururaja Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem (Minerva Press, New Delhi, 
India 2002); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict:  India, Pakistan and the 
Unending War (I.B. Tauris, London, 2003). 
57 Id. at note 46, at 35. 
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the International Court of Justice in disputes with India.  Pakistan would cite 
the 1928 Act to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in two (2) cases involving 
disputes with India, Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India)58 
and Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India).59  India took the 
view that the 1928 Act was a political treaty that could not be transmitted 
automatically to successor States from the Partition.  Any confusion on the 
succession to the 1928 Act would be eliminated in 1974, when India sent its 
written communication to the Secretary General of the United Nations 
categorically disavowing any binding effect of the 1928 Act since India’s 
independence in 1947.60 
Notwithstanding post-independence disputes within the new states of 
the region, South Asia would be an active participant and a leading advocate 
in the decolonization process and dialogue facilitated by the United Nations, 
culminating with the General Assembly’s landmark 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.61  In 1947, 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Asian Relations 
Conference, which brought together many Asian leaders and reasserted the 
end of European imperialism in Asia.62  
India under Nehru also led the region’s rejection of the (then 
Eurocentric) constitutivist position on recognition of states that had caused 
controversy during the colonial period, in favour of a declaratory position that 
empowered newly emergent postcolonial states.63 Despite the Eurocentric 
genesis of classical positivist international law, however, Nehru would lay a 
                                                 
58 Id. at note 46, at 36.  Upon Pakistan’s request, the Court discontinued 
proceedings after Pakistan and India reached a negotiated settlement.  Trial of 
Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India) Order of 15 December 1973, [1973] 
ICJ Rep 347. 
59 Id. at note 46 at 36-37.  Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India) 
(Jurisdiction) [2000] ICJ Rep 12. 
60 For a concise issue summary on India’s succession to treaties concluded by 
British India, see M.K. Nawaz, The Changing Law of Nations:  An Indian Focus 
(Eastern Law House Ltd., Calcutta, India, 2000), 12-18. 
61 UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960).  Full text available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm (last visited 20 October 2008).  See 
also Zoltán Szilágyi, The United Nations’ Role in the Liquidation of Colonialism 
(Institute for World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 
Hungary, 1986), 27-85. 
62 RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India ((Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 103-104.   
63 Id. at note 46, at 38-39.  
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policy of Indian acceptance of its norms, with the qualification that norm-
creation would not be a Euro-American preserve, but rather, a broader process 
of development conjoined with the new realities and contingencies of 
international life.  Nehru’s Panch Sheel (principles of peaceful co-
existence),64 initially articulated in a 1954 treaty with China, would resonate 
across time to many of South and Southeast Asia’s regional instruments on 
international law, most especially the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
of Southeast Asia that laid the foundation for the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 1985 Charter of the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).65 
South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, would also lead reform 
efforts of the international economic system in the 1970s.66  Together with 
other Third World countries newly emerging from colonial rule, South Asia 
joined in the United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO Declaration),67 
which, in the wake of colonialism, ought to be founded on certain principles, 
including, among others:   
1. sovereign equality of states, self-determination of all peoples, 
inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by force, territorial 
                                                 
64 The five principles are:  1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; 
3) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.  RP Anand, Development 
of Modern International Law and India (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 
Germany, 2005), 101-114. 
65 Id. at note 18.  See Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia, 24 February 1976 (full text available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm, last visited 20 October 2008) [hereafter, TAC]; 
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Bangladesh, 8 
December 1985 (full text available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf, 
last visited 20 October 2008) [hereafter, SAARC Charter]. 
66 Jagdish Bhagwati (ed), The New International Economic Order:  The North-
South Debate (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States, 1977);T.S. 
Rama Rao, “The New International Economic Order and the North-South Dialogue” 
in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of 
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. 
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983); R.C. Hingorani, “New International Economic 
Order”, in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of 
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. 
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983). 
67 UNGA Res 3201(S-VI) (1974)  UN Doc A/RES/S-6/3201. 
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integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
States;  
2. broadest cooperation of all States members of the international 
community based on equity;  
3. full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all 
countries in solving world economic problems in the common 
interest of all countries;  
4. the right of every country to adopt the economic and social 
system that it deems most appropriate for its own development;  
5. full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural 
resources and all economic activities, entitling each State to 
exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with 
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to 
nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right 
being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the 
State;  
6. the right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign 
occupation, alien and colonial domination or apartheid to 
restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and 
depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other 
resources of those States, territories, and peoples;  
7. regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational 
corporations;  
8. the right of the developing countries and the peoples of territories 
under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation to 
achieve their liberation and to regain effective control over their 
natural resources and economic activities;  
9. extending assistance, free of any political or military conditions, 
to developing countries, peoples and territories which are under 
colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation, racial 
discrimination or apartheid, and all forms of neo-colonialism;  
10. just and equitable relationship between the prices of developing 
country exports and imports;  
11. promotion of development in the reform of the international 
monetary system;  
12. preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries 
in all fields of international economic cooperation; and  
13. developing countries’ access to technology transfers and financial 
resources.  Alongside the NIEO Declaration, South Asia also 
joined in the General Assembly’s adoption of the North-South 
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Programme of Action and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States.68 
Many of the foregoing principles also underlie the nature and scope of 
regional cooperation in South Asia.  Regional cooperation in South Asia is 
facilitated under the SAARC, composed of the seven South Asian states of 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  
SAARC heads of state meet annually, or as often as considered necessary by 
the member states.69   
Policy-making, review of progress of cooperation, decisions on new 
areas of cooperation, establishment of additional mechanisms deemed 
necessary, and decisions on other matters of general interest to SAARC are 
functions assumed by the SAARC Council of Ministers, composed of the 
Foreign Ministers of the SAARC member states, and which meets at least bi-
annually.70 Operational functions are discharged by the Standing Committee 
(constituted by the foreign secretaries of the SAARC member states) which is 
responsible for overall monitoring and coordination of SAARC cooperation 
programs;71and the Technical Committees (with representatives from the 
SAARC member states) which are responsible for the implementation, 
coordination, and monitoring of programmes in their respective areas of 
cooperation.72  SAARC has since expanded its areas of cooperation to include 
economic and social issues, from tariff reductions and bilateral initiatives for 
potential free trade agreements among SAARC members, financial and 
monetary issues, to poverty alleviation, the environment, housing, women and 
children’s rights, tourism, among others.73   
On 4 January 2004, SAARC enacted its Social Charter, which 
“consolidate[s] the multifarious commitments of SAARC Member States in 
the social sector and provide[s] a practical platform for concerted, coherent, 
and complementary action in determining social priorities, improving the 
                                                 
68 UNGA Res 3202 (S-VI) (1974) UN Doc A/RES/S-6/3202; UNGA Res 3281 
(XXIX) (1974), UN GAOR 29th Session Supp 31, 50. 
69 Article III, SAARC Charter. 
70 Article IV, SAARC Charter. 
71 Article V(1), SAARC Charter. 
72 Articles V and VI, SAARC Charter. 
73 Nihal Rodrigo, “SAARC as an institutional framework for cooperation in 
South Asia”, in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), South Asia in the World:  
Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (United Nations University Press, New York, United States, 2004). 
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structure and content of social policies and programmes, ensuring greater 
efficiency in the utilization of national, regional and external resources and in 
enhancing the equity and sustainability of social programmes and the quality 
of living conditions of their beneficiaries.”74  The SAARC Social Charter sets 
forth comprehensive socio-economic and development commitments as 
binding obligations of SAARC member states, including, among others:  
1. “affirm[ing] that the highest priority shall be accorded to the 
alleviation of poverty in South Asian Countries”;75  
2. “agree[ing] that access to basic education, adequate housing, safe 
drinking water and sanitation, and primary health care should be 
guaranteed in legislation, executive and administrative provisions, 
in addition to ensuring an adequate standard of living, including 
adequate shelter, food and clothing”;76  
3. “shar[ing] information regarding the outbreak of any 
communicable disease” and “agree[ing] to hold prior consultation 
on issues [health issues related to livelihood and trade issues 
which are influenced by international agreements and 
conventions] and to make an effort to arrive at a coordinated 
stand on issues that relate to the health of their population;”77  
4. various obligations to promote the status of women, prevent their 
discrimination and exploitation, and ensure their empowerment 
through literacy and education;78  
5. extensively-enumerated obligations to promote the rights and 
well-being of children;79 and  
6. other pressing social issues such as population stabilisation, drug 
de-addiction, rehabilitation and reintegration.80   
The implementation of the SAARC Social Charter is facilitated by National 
Coordination Committees and the SAARC Secretariat, and is mainly left to 
member states’ respective domestic institutional competencies to 
operationalize the SAARC Social Charter obligations.81 
                                                 
74 Preamble, last clause, SAARC Social Charter. Full text available at 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?id=13 (last visited 20 October 2008). 
75 Article III(1), SAARC Social Charter. 
76 Article III(4), SAARC Social Charter. 
77 Article IV(1) and IV(4), SAARC Social Charter. 
78 Article VI, SAARC Social Charter. 
79 Article VII, SAARC Social Charter. 
80 Articles VIII and IX, SAARC Social Charter. 
81 Article X, SAARC Social Charter. 
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Since its inception in 1985, SAARC has remained an 
intergovernmental association and has not constituted itself as a formally-
integrated regional organization.82  Its primary focus is on socio-economic 
issues, and not on political issues.  The first clause of the Preamble to the 
SAARC Charter stresses “strict adherence to the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and Non-Alignment, particularly respect for the principles of 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of 
force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes,” with such principles also reiterated in Article 
II of the SAARC Charter.83  Areas of regional cooperation include agriculture, 
rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, and health, with 
decisions at all levels in the SAARC “taken on the basis of unanimity,” and 
with the qualification that “[b]ilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded 
from the deliberations of the Association.”84   
A South Asian scholar describes these provisions “not as obstacles 
but as safeguards to protect the young organization from entanglement in 
issues extraneous to regional cooperation.  The provisions have been invoked 
on many occasions and their applicability in different situations has been 
debated at length, both within as well as outside SAARC.  The taboo on the 
discussion of bilateral issues has helped SAARC to avoid being diverted from 
its primary Charter objectives.  Yet the spirit of the injunction has not always 
been heeded and, when combined with the unanimity provision, this had led 
to delays and postponements of ministerial and summit meetings.  The 
unanimity provision in effect renders to each member of SAARC the power 
of a veto.”85 
As seen above, SAARC’s limited institutional competencies 
purposely do not address conflict resolution in South Asia.  In the aftermath 
of independence, South Asia has become a theatre for intraregional conflicts 
and political tensions:   
1. the India-Pakistan conflict on Jammu and Kashmir, which, after 
three wars and separate nuclear tests conducted by both states, 
remains at a precarious political stalemate;  
2. the tenuous political situation in Nepal arising from Maoist 
insurgency, which, despite a peace accord reached by the 
                                                 
82 See Dr. O.P. Goel (ed), India and SAARC Engagements (Volumes 1-2) (Isha 
Books, Delhi, India, 2004). 
83 Preamble, first clause, SAARC Charter. 
84 Articles X(1) and X(2), SAARC Charter. 
85 Id. at note 69.   
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democratic government and the Maoists in November 2006 
providing for the Maoists’ entry into a transitional government 
with a view towards United Nations-monitored elections for a 
constituent assembly, nevertheless still resulted in the failure of 
the peace process, followed by Parliament’s abolition of the 
monarchy in December 2007, and in May 28, 2008, Nepal’s 
transformation to a federal democratic republic (Maoist Chairman 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda would be elected the first Prime 
Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal on August 
15, 2008);  
3. unresolved issues of Bhutanese refugees which are potentially 
destabilizing to Bhutan and Nepal;  
4. separatist insurgencies in northeast India;  
5. the continued separatist struggles of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; among other security threats 
posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human 
trafficking, and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other communicable 
diseases.  
Due to SAARC’s limited mandate, however, conflict resolution 
mechanisms in South Asia still depend, for the most part, on informal political 
consultations.86  Relatively open and porous borders, conducive to inter-state 
migration and movement of refugees, have contributed to the region’s 
vulnerability to conflicts.87  The nuclear capabilities of the geographically-
proximate and primary South Asian actors --- India and Pakistan (both of 
which are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
                                                 
86 Niaz A. Naik, “A Security Organization for South Asia: Mechanism for 
Conflict Resolution in South Asia”, in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), 
South Asia in the World:  Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance (United Nations University Press, New York, 
United States, 2004).  See also D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (trs), Armed 
Conflicts in South Asia 2008:  Growing Violence (Routledge, India, April 2008); 
Armed Conflict Database, International Institute for Strategic Studies, available at 
http://www.iiss.org/ (last visited 25 October 2008); Kingsley de Silva, “Terrorism and 
Political Agitation in Post-colonial South Asia:  Jammu-Kashmir and Sri Lanka”, in 
Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), South Asia in the World:  Problem Solving 
Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good Governance (United 
Nations University Press, New York, United States, 2004).   
87 Lok Raj Baral, “National Security:  Inter-State Conflict in South Asia (a Nepali 
Perspective)”, in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), South Asia in the World:  
Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (United Nations University Press, New York, United States, 2004).   
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) --- raises the urgency for a South 
Asian conflict resolution mechanism or institutional system for settling 
bilateral and intraregional disputes.88  Despite bilateral or intraregional 
differences, however, South Asia has made substantial contributions to the 
United Nations’ own peacekeeping operations, and other international 
initiatives to maintain international peace and security.89 
South Asia has also made innumerable contributions to the 
development of the law of the sea.  As described by one scholar, “...all the 
newly-independent South Asian states, in tune with the times, have tried to 
take the maximum benefit of the current turmoil in the [law of the sea to] 
extend their national jurisdictions.”90  India’s 1976 Maritime Zones Act 
demarcated its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles (nm); its contiguous 
zone limit to twenty-four nm for purposes of security, immigration, sanitation, 
customs, and other fiscal matters; and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to two 
hundred nm.  With India’s central position in the Indian Ocean (having a 
continental coastline of about 5700 kilometers, 1200 islands and islets, and 
traversing many crucial international maritime routes, about 131, 800 sq.nm. 
of continental shelf and margin), India also added many prime maritime 
routes and areas to its sovereign jurisdiction.  India’s maritime claims would 
fall well-within the framework of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, with India gaining about 587,600 sq.nm as part of its EEZ.  India is also 
recognized as a ‘pioneer investor’ in seabed exploratory activities for the 
recovery of polymetallic nodules from the ocean.   
On the other hand, Pakistan has not yet fully demarcated its maritime 
boundary with India, particularly with respect to the Rann of Kutch, about 
90% of which had been awarded to India by an international arbitral tribunal.  
                                                 
88 See Stephen P. Cohen, “Nuclear weapons and nuclear war in South Asia:  
Unknowable futures”, and Christophe Carle, “International security in a nuclear South 
Asia”, both in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), South Asia in the World:  
Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (United Nations University Press, New York, United States, 2004).   
89 Satish Nambiar, “South Asian Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping 
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Ahmed Roomy, “The United Nations and South Asia:  Bangladesh’s contribution to 
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90 RP Anand, “South Asia and the Law of the Sea:  Problems and Prospects”, in 
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Sri Lankan proposals for the limited expansion of its continental shelf, in view 
of the special characteristics of its continental margin, were admitted in the 
1982 UNCLOS Convention (Sri Lanka was permitted to establish the outer 
edge of its continental fixed points defined by latitude and longitude, at each 
of which the thickness of sedimentary rock was not less than one kilometre.)  
Sri Lanka and India completed their boundary delimitations in 1977; however, 
both states claim the Palk Strait, Palk Bay, and the Gulf of Manaar as part of 
each state’s historic waters.91   
Following the enactment of its 1974 Territorial Waters and Maritime 
Zones Act, Bangladesh has also had serious delimitation disputes with India 
about their overlapping maritime boundaries.  In view of Bangladesh’s 
specific geomorphological considerations (e.g. “the estuary of Bangladesh is 
such that no stable water line or demarcation of landward and seaward area 
exists”; “the continual process of alluvian and sedimentation forms mud 
banks, and the area is so shallow as to be non-navigable by other than small 
boats”; “the navigable channels through the aforesaid banks are continuously 
changing their course and require soundings to establish their demarcation”), 
Bangladesh proposed an amendment to Article 4 of the Territorial Sea 
Convention to delineate baselines using the depth method for establishing 
baselines, instead of the ‘normal baselines’ or ‘straight baselines’ standards in 
the law of the sea.  The amendment was not accepted, but Article 7(2) of the 
1982 Convention attempted to meet the situation.92   
Other maritime disputes between Bangladesh and India involve the 
1970 formation of a new island in the Bay of Bengal (known as New Moore 
Island or Purbasha in India and South Talpatty island in Bangladesh), 
boundaries with Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the sharing of river waters, 
                                                 
91 Id. at note 90.  See B.R. Chauhan, “Fixation and Delimitation of Maritime 
Frontiers” in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of 
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. 
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983). 
92 Article 7(2):  “Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural 
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subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain 
effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention.” 
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the construction of the Farakka barrage, and the exchange of small land 
enclaves on the Indo-Bangladesh border, among others.93   
Other South Asian states have also negotiated (or are in the process of 
negotiating) maritime boundaries.  Maldives concluded its agreements with 
India and Sri Lanka in 1976, but has an unusual claim based on its 1964 
Constitution which defined the territory of Maldives as “the islands, air and 
sea surrounding and in between the islands contained within a rectangle 
formed by meridians and parallels.”94  (The EEZ claim around the Maldives’ 
constitutional rectangle has not been recognized thus far.)  Nepal and Bhutan, 
both landlocked States dependent on coastal states such as India for transit 
passage, are constrained to rely on Article 69 of UNCLOS to “participate, on 
an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of 
the living resources of the EEZs of the coastal States of the same sub-region 
or region.”95 
South Asia has also staunchly advocated the development of 
international environmental law and outer space law.96  India actively 
participated in the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and thereafter enacted 
amendments to its Constitution as well as parliamentary legislation in order to 
give effect to many commitments articulated in the Stockholm Declaration 
                                                 
93 Id. at note 90.  See D.W. Wadegaonkar, “Changing Concept of the 
Determination of Maritime Frontiers and the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries”, 
in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of 
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. 
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983). 
94 Id. at note 90.   
95 UNCLOS (1982), Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
Convention, Article 69 (Right of Landlocked States).  Full text available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last 
visited 10 October 2008).  See V.C. Govindaraj, “Land-Locked States and the Law of 
the Sea” in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of 
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. 
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983). 
96 See Shyami Fernando Puvimanasinghe, Foreign Investment, Human Rights, 
and the Enviroment:  A Perspective from South Asia on the Role of Public 
International Law for Development (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 
2007); Lakshman Guruswamy, “Environment and Trade:  Competing Paradigms in 
International Law”, in Antony Anghie and Garry Sturgess (trs), Legal Visions of the 
21st Century:  Essays in Honour of Judge Christopher Weeramantry (Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, Boston, 1998). 
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and the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 2977 (XXVII) in 1972.97 Within 
a broad spectrum of international environmental issues and concerns, South 
Asia has been particularly vocal in its support for the establishment of 
international cooperation for ensuring sustainable development practices and 
technology transfers, environmental compensation and/or financial assistance, 
and fundamental international environmental law principles such as the 
prohibition against transboundary harms, the precautionary principle, the 
polluter-pays principle, intergenerational equity, and sustainable 
development.98   
To provide a regional institutional cooperative response to problems 
of environmental degradation, common resource management, and joint 
initiatives on environment and development, South Asian states established an 
inter-governmental programme, the South Asian Cooperative Environment 
Programme (SACEP) in 1982.99  With respect to outer space law, India’s 
space policies, activities, and institutions demonstrate strong and continued 
participation in the implementation and/or further interpretive development of 
multilateral treaties (such as the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space; the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space; and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) and resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly with normative content for regulating space 
activities (such as, among others, the 1982 Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting; the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space; the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space; and the 1996 Declaration on International 
                                                 
97 See A. David Ambrose, “International Environmental Law and India”, in 
Bimal N. Patel (ed), India and International Law (Brill Academic Publishers, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands, 2005). 
98 Id. at note 97.  See Alexander J. Bolla and Ted L. McDorman (trs), 
Comparative Asian Environmental Law Anthology (Carolina Academic Press, 
Durham, North Carolina, United States, 1999); Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, Thomas 
A. Mensah, and Bernard H. Oxman (trs), Sustainable Development and the 
Preservation of the Oceans: The Challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 21 (Law of the 
Sea Institute, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 
1997). 
99 See http://www.sacep.org/html/about_overview.htm (last visited 20 October 
2008). 
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Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in 
the Interest of All States).100 
South Asia’s multidirectional engagement of, and contributions to the 
development of, modern international law has inspired concomitant proposals 
for teaching methodologies and curricular content of international law in 
South Asian law schools. Concrete suggestions were advanced on how to 
reorient international law teaching and curriculum in the region:  
1. viewing international law “sociologically, as a device of building 
community institutions by the development of consensus, the 
search for common interests and the management of conflicts --- 
at the same time satisfying the normal complementary legal needs 
of stability of expectations and the requirements of change”;  
2. developing interdisciplinary skills, or for international law 
professors to “become specialists in some aspects of international 
law” and encouraging specialized monographic writings and 
empirical studies;  
3. the redistribution of the current content of international law 
courses to ensure exposure to aspects of international law as 
would “sharpen thought and analysis in traditional legal courses”, 
and “help institutionalize awareness of relatedness of 
international and legal developments”;101  and accordingly,  
4. the restructuring of law degrees to reflect the proposed curricular 
revisions.102   
                                                 
100 C. Jayaraj, “The Law of Outer Space and India” in Bimal N. Patel (ed), India 
and International Law (Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands, 2005); J.N. Singh, Outer Space, Outer Sea, Outer Land and 
International Law (Harnam, New Delhi, 1987); P.P.C. Haanappel, The Law and 
Policy of Air Space and Outer Space:  A Comparative Approach (Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, New York, 2003). 
101 Upendra Baxi, “Teaching of International Law in India in 2000 A.D. – Some 
Non-Utopian Proposals”, in .K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New 
Horizons of International Law and Developing Countries (International Law 
Association, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983).  See also M.K. Nawaz, “On the 
Ways and Means of Improving Research of International Law in India”, in ”, in .K. 
Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of International Law 
and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 
India, 1983). 
102 Kl Vibhute, ‘International Law in India – Developing Curricula and Teaching:  
Some Reflections’ (2001) 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 388-404. 
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Thus, while early postcolonial international law scholarship in South 
Asia proved valuable in “indict[ing] colonial international law for legitimizing 
the subjugation and oppression of Asian peoples”; “emphasiz[ing] that Asian 
states were not strangers to the idea of international law”; “argu[ing] that 
there was nothing in the cultural traditions of Asian peoples that prevented 
them from participating fully in the contemporary international legal process;” 
and advocating “reform, rather than repudiation” of international law towards 
its expansion, postmodern South Asian international law scholarship 
highlights the failure to see neo-colonial structures in international law and 
institutions of the international legal order, as well as the conceptual defects 
of inordinately relying on positivist methodology in the teaching and research 
of international law.103  Measures proposed to respond to these concerns 
include, among others:   
1. recognition that international law now seeks to “displace 
municipal law in regulating core aspects of sovereign economic 
and political space”;  
2. expansion of the normative content of international law taking 
into account the discursive influences of non-state actors and 
gender;  
3. scaling back on ‘overspecialization’ that leads to fragmentation 
and under-theorization of international law; and  
4. dissecting the decision-making processes of international 
institutions, imposing duties on international property holders 
such as transnational/multinational corporations, and revealing 
the underlying themes of dominance and power in sustainable 
development and human rights discourse. 
Southeast Asia and International Law 
In contrast to South Asia, the ten (10) countries comprising the 
Southeast Asian region (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar) 
have had a relatively shorter (documented) history of regional engagement 
towards the development of contemporary international law.  While there 
were about forty kingdoms, principalities, and sultanates spread across 
Southeast Asia in antiquity, paradigms of statehood were hardly uniform.104  
Neither were Southeast Asian states identifiable with homogenous or closely 
                                                 
103 BS Chimni, ‘Teaching, Research, and Promotion of International Law in 
India:  Past, Present, and Future’ (2001) 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 368-387. 
104 See Amry Vandenbosch, ‘Regionalism in Southeast Asia’ (1946) The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 4, 427-438. 
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similar cultural polities, as had been the case in the predominantly Indo-
centric South Asia.  
Early modern Southeast Asian states were roughly classifiable into 
agrarian/mainland societies (such as those that preceded Burma, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia, and whose governance structures were characterized by 
centralized official hierarchies and semi-divine kings), and sea-based or 
archipelagic kingdoms (those that preceded Sumatra, Malaya, North Java, 
Brunei in North Borneo were governed by ‘aristocratic elites’ that controlled 
the trading fleet).105 Modernity (if taken in its broader eclectic acceptation and 
not exclusively from the lens of pure Eurocentrism) was also apparent from 
these ‘early modern’ (pre-colonial) Southeast Asian states.106 
Mainland societies among the pre-colonial/ancient Southeast Asian 
states shared the following major structural, political, and cultural 
convergences:  
1. some form of territorial consolidation among agrarian or sea-
based polities, which made the early modern empires (such as the 
Burmese, Thai and Vietnamese empires in c. 1100- c.1250) 
“more effectively integrated both administratively and culturally 
than their classical antecedents”, and with such imperial 
consolidations “exhibit[ing] a common structure and rhythm 
heavily influenced by the mainland’s north-south segmentation”, 
since the empires “centered initially on one of the major north-
south corridors, which were particularly favoured in their 
agricultural/geographic resources and/or in their access to 
maritime trade:  the Irrawaddy basin of Burma, the Chaophraya 
basin of Thailand, and the Song-koi basin and associated coastal 
districts of what is now north and central Vietnam”;  
2. administrative centralization from the mainland that “facilitated 
and accompanied territorial consolidation”;  
3. political integration in these early modern empires that “both 
encouraged and mirrored a long-term tendency, naturally more 
pronounced in the central lowlands than in upland areas or in 
                                                 
105 M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of Southeast Asia (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, New York, 1978); see also Nicholas Tarling (ed), The Cambridge 
History of Southeast Asia:  From early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge University Press, 
United Kingdom, 1999). 
106 Barbara Watson Andaya, “Historicising ‘Modernity’ in Southeast Asia” 
(1997) Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Volume 40, No. 4, 
391-409. 
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distant vassal states, towards the acceptance of centrally-defined 
norms”; and  
4. as religious/cultic practices and styles of imperial capitals set 
standards for local elites, “capital cultures adhered more closely 
to orthodox, textually-derived religious/cultic norms,” so much so 
that, for example, Burmese, Thai, Lao, Shan, and Cambodian 
courts would move “towards more self-consciously Theravada 
Buddhist modes of ceremonial, literary, legal, and monastic 
expression.”   
A similar pattern would appear from the neo-Confucian revolution in Vietnam 
that accelerated or initiated “a trend towards the adoption of Chinese models 
of ritual, scholarship, law and literature.”107   
 
On the other hand, the pattern of political and cultural integration of 
archipelagic/sea-based Southeast Asian societies (present-day Malaysia, 
Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines) has been characterized by:   
1. the dramatic penetration of new religious systems (Islam and 
Christianity) that “segment[ed] a more or less fluid Southeast 
Asian cultural matrix into four mutually-exclusive zones [Neo-
Confucianism, orthodox Theravada Buddhism, Islam and 
Christianity] that endure, with various permutations, to the 
present”;  
2. fragmented and decentralized indigenous polities whose evolution 
was more susceptible to the influences of maritime commerce; 
and  
3. apart from “novel religious expressions and circumscribed 
movements of territorial consolidation,” other stimuli to long-
term integration would be similar as those that factored in the 
political-cultural integration of mainland Southeast Asian 
societies (e.g. growing maritime trade; the legitimizing prestige of 
imported religious systems; the centralizing potential of firearms; 
and the imperative of interstate competition).108 
Early modern Southeast Asian law would thus emerge from the heavy 
normative influence and infusion of Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese legal 
                                                 
107 See Victor Lieberman, ‘Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies:  
Structuring Southeast Asian History, c. 1350 – c. 1830’, (1993) Modern Asian 
Studies, Volume 27, No. 3, 475-572. 
108 Id. at note 105.  See also Craig J. Reynolds, ‘A New Look at Old Southeast 
Asia’ (1995) The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 54, No. 2, 419-446. 
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traditions.109 For Burma, Siam, Champa and Khmer, Hindu law provided rules 
on moral and social conduct traceable to the Code of Manu which “codified 
law in ten categories and solved disputes through collective decision-making 
(mushawara-mufakat), a process that remains one of the most important 
techniques of handling administrative affairs in modern Javanese society.” 110  
Buddhist kingdoms in Burma, Thailand, and Laos drew from Buddhist texts 
providing ethical rules of conduct through theistically-driven conceptions of 
obligation, as seen in the legal traditions contained in Burma’s Dhammathat 
and Thailand’s Dhammasattham.  Ancient societies in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and southern Philippines, and Brunei were governed by Islamic law, 
principally through the interrelated structures of the Koran and the Shariah.  
Chinese legal traditions that extended to Vietnam drew from the teachings of 
Confucianism.111   
Forms of Southeast Asian law would include:  
1. written texts (Oriental laws that were Indian-derived, Islamic, or 
Chinese-derived; as well as Occidental laws from English, 
French, Dutch, and Spanish-American laws);  
2. oral law (such as the “Burmese law tales, the Minangkabau 
perbilangan”, the Malay/Javanese wayang and the Thai nang 
talung);  
3. law in social institutions (normative systems in the Indonesian 
adat, Malaya, Ifugao, and the Bahnar code);  and  
4. indigenous adaptations (the attempt “to make sense of the formal 
system in what is still largely a peasant world by adapting forms 
derived from the formal state system”).   
Southeast Asian law’s “striking feature” would be its legal pluralism, where 
“status laws have been subsumed under or absorbed into the categories and 
processes of the introduced municipal law so as to produce a body of hybrid 
rules and principles.112 
                                                 
109 M.B. Hooker, Laws of Southeast Asia:  Volumes 1 and 2 (Butterworth Legal 
Publishers, Singapore, 1986-1988). 
110 Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders, Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems 
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002) 14-17. 
111 See Tony Day and Craig J. Reynolds, ‘Cosmologies, Truth Regimes, and the 
State in Southeast Asia’ (2000) Modern Asian Studies, Volume 34, No. 1, 1-55. 
112 M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of Southeast Asia (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1978), 1-14, at 9:  “The Southeast Asian legal world is thus a world of 
conflict of laws.  This was not always so:  in the pre-European period there was a 
coexistence of legal ideas which occasionally resulted in a blend of principle; conflict 
was not invetiable.  Even in the case of formally exclusive systems, such as Islamic 
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Relatively recent histories on Southeast Asian encounters with 
modernity take up the themes of:  
1. the “reconstruction of Southeast Asian historical time through its 
history and biography”;  
2. a deeper interrogation of “the dynamic interplay of colonial and 
local knowledge; the inventions of tradition, and the contested 
modernity within each”; and  
3. the recognition that the “rediscovery of colonial history is also a 
re-examination of the nation.”113  
These themes explain how the complex process of entrenchment of Euro-
American colonial powers (France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United States) from the seventeenth (17th) to the 
nineteenth (19th) centuries would bear pervasive effects on Southeast Asian 
legal structures:  “[i]n each colony, doctrines evolved to govern the new mix 
of Western and traditional law, and by the end of the colonial era, the forty 
states in Southeast Asia had shrunk to approximately ten.”114   
Colonial authorities tended to delegate (some) administrative powers 
to the “co-opted local rulers”, transforming legal frameworks towards unequal 
relationships:  “[m]atters of personal status were generally left in the realm of 
customary law, although individual rights and freedoms were considerably 
restrained by legal regimes designed to control and monitor rather than 
liberate and foster.  Different laws applied to the indigenous population and 
the Europeans, and the unequal nature of these relationships planted the seeds 
of aspirations towards autonomy, nationalism and independence.”115 
                                                                                                                    
law, accommodations did take place.”  See Richard A. Gard, ‘Ideological Problems in 
Southeast Asia’ (1953) Philosophy East and West, Volume 2, No. 4, 292-307. 
113 T.N. Harper, ‘Asian Values and Southeast Asian Histories’ (1997) The 
Historical Journal, Volume 40, No. 2, 507-517.  See also G. Carter Bentley, 
‘Indigenous States of Southeast Asia’ (1986) Annual Review of Anthropology, 
Volume 15, 275-305. 
114 Id. at note 106, at 19-21.  Portuguese colonial enclaves were in Goa, Diu, 
Daman, Calicut, Colombo, Malacca, Macau, Java, the Moluccas, and Timor, with a 
lease relationship with China covering Macau; British colonies in Penang, Singapore, 
the Malay states, British Borneo and Burma, with a lease relationship with China 
covering Hong Kong; French holdings were Laos and Vietnam as regions of 
Indochina; and Spain held the Philippines until their cession of the territory to the 
United States in 1898. 
115 Id. at note 106, at 27. 
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The common ‘hybridity’ of Southeast Asian legal systems (e.g. Euro-
American legal conceptions existing alongside indigenous normative systems 
stretching back to ancient Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese legal traditions), and 
the consequent diversity of their ideological bases, would presage Southeast 
Asia’s transformation into a critical theatre for Cold War tensions.116  While 
newly-independent Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia would join South 
Asian countries (such as India) in strongly advocating the 1955 Bandung 
Conference’s Declaration of Principles, Southeast Asian states differed in the 
political basis and vision for implementing the Bandung principles.  A scholar 
starkly describes how ten years after the Bandung Conference, Southeast Asia 
was on the precipice of open intra-regional hostilities:   
Indonesia, under President Sukarno and Foreign Minister 
Subandrio, was outwardly very powerful, especially within the Non-
Aligned Group, and was flirting with the Socialist countries.  The PKI 
(Partai Komunis Indonesia) was the largest Communist party in the 
world outside of the USSR.  An axis was formed linking together 
Pyong Yang (North Korea), Peking (China), Hanoi (North Vietnam), 
Phnom Penh (Cambodia), and Jakarta (Indonesia).   At this juncture, 
the United Kingdom...decided to create Malaysia by adding the 
territories of Sarawak and Sabah to the Federation of Malaya.  
Malaysia was born as an extension of an existing state.  Sukarno was 
not pleased with Greater Malaysia.  As if to add insult to injury, the 
United Nations not only recognized Malaysia as successor State to the 
Malay Federation but also the new State was elected member to the 
Security Council.  Subandrio adopted the policy of Konfrontasi or 
‘Confrontation Against Malaysia’.  Before the latter took its seat in 
the Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations 
altogether and intensified her ‘Confrontation’ policy, opposing 
Malaysia’s admission to the Asian-African Conference in Algeria.  
Paratroopers were dropped inside Malaysian territory in Sarawak and 
Malacca, and there were sporadic disturbances in Singapore. xxx The 
Philippines also protested against the addition of Sabah to Malaysia 
as it had a long-standing claim traceable to the Sultanate of Sulu.  The 
discord between the Philippines and Malaysia disrupted the progress 
of the ASA [Association of Southeast Asia] which during this critical 
period continued to subsist in a state of suspended animation.”117 
                                                 
116 See Paul Kelemen, ‘Southeast Asia Between the Superpowers’ (1981) 
Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 16, No. 37, 1503-1508;  
117 Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘ASEAN Society, A Dynamic Experiment for 
Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation’ (1991) 1 Asian Y.B. Int’l L. 113-148, at 121.  
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Initial attempts at regional organization in Southeast Asia thus proved 
short-lived and ineffectual in resolving the security tensions arising from the 
Konfrontasi as well as related separatism issues within the region.118  The 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), formed in 1954 under the 
influence of the United States (with the participation of Australia, Britain, 
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United 
States), was “more accurately described as part of the worldwide US-led 
system of anti-Communist military alliances, or security arrangements, than 
as a true Southeast Asian regional arrangement.”  The Asian and Pacific 
Council (ASPAC), organized at the initiative of South Korea’s President Park 
Chung-hee in 1966, only had four Southeast Asian states as its members 
(Malaysia, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand), but it collapsed 
after seven years due to contradictory and/or conflicting objectives of being 
“non-military, non-ideological, and not anti-Communist” while resolved to 
“preserve their integrity and sovereignty in the face of external threats.”  
From 1959-1961, then Prime Minister of Malaya Tunku Abdul 
Rahman would spearhead the creation of the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA) (composed only of then Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand),but this 
organization would suffer from hostilities between the Philippines and Malaya 
over the latter’s formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which included 
Philippine claims to Sabah. A similar fate would befall the Malaysia-
Philippines-Indonesia Association (MAPHILINDO), established in 1963, but 
would become wholly ineffective upon the refusal of Indonesia and the 
Philippines to recognize the new Federation of Malaysia, and Indonesia’s 
subsequent guerrilla war against Malaysia (the Konfrontasi) that lasted until 
1967. 119   
The regional political landscape would irrevocably change with the 
formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed 
ASEAN through constitutive instruments such as the 1967 ASEAN 
(Bangkok) Declaration and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
                                                                                                                    
See Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia:  To Foster the Political Will 
(Routledge, United Kingdom, 2006). 
118 See David Brown, ‘From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations:  
Separatism in Southeast Asia’ (1988) Pacific Affairs, Volume 61, No. 1, 51-77; 
Vincent K. Pollard, ‘ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967:  Southeast Asian Regionalism’ 
(1970) Asian Survey, Volume 10, No.3, 244-255. 
119 Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington 
Books, Canada, United States, 1991), 59-74. 
420 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 36.3 
 
 
in Southeast Asia.120  Since 1967, ASEAN expanded its current membership 
to ten, including Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia.  Under the terms of the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was 
constituted as simply an “association for regional cooperation”, with the 
following core developmental and security objectives:   
1. “accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit 
of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation 
for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian 
Nations”;  
2. “promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of 
the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter”;  
3. “promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, 
scientific and administrative fields”;  
4. “provide assistance to each other in the form of training and 
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical, and 
administrative spheres”;  
5. “collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including 
the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the 
improvement of their transportation and communications 
facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples”;  
6. “promote Southeast Asian studies”; and  
7. “maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves.”   
To achieve these cooperative aims, the TAC strictly enjoins ASEAN member 
States to observe the fundamental principles of mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity 
of the respective member states; freedom from external interference, 
subversion, or coercion; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
peaceful settlement of disputes.121   
                                                 
120 See Treaty of Amity and Cooperatiom in Southeast Asia [hereafter, TAC], 
Indonesia, 24 February 1976 (full text at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm last 
visited 20 August 2008); ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, Thailand, 8 August 1967 
(full text at http://www.aseansec.org/1212/htm last visited 20 August 2008). 
121 TAC, Articles 1 and 2. 
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As a regional organization, ASEAN’s largest success to date has been 
the containment and/or prevention of intra-regional conflicts among its 
member States --- success largely attributed to its cooperative orientation (the 
“ASEAN Way”) through processes of consultation, negotiation, and 
consensus (mushawara and mufakat).  In the early years since its formation, 
ASEAN was “strictly a sub-regional organization of the free-market non-
communist states of the region --- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, with the addition of Brunei in 1984.  The 
Communist Indochina states were excluded and contested ASEAN’s right to 
shape regional order in a way that was manifest over the Cambodian issue.  
Second, ASEAN security perspectives were based upon Cold War realities 
that for Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore included a reliance upon a 
US military presence in the region.   
The nonaligned countries of ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
formulated a basis for decoupling the region from superpower rivalry:  the 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) or the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration of November 1971.”122  As a regional cooperation, ASEAN has 
operated under a highly decentralized structure, establishing key institutions 
for its various fields of cooperation.123  As initially envisioned by ASEAN’s 
founding members, ASEAN has promoted constructive political dialogue over 
the last four decades that has prevented the escalation of political tensions into 
armed conflict between ASEAN countries.  In 1994, ASEAN established the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which facilitates cooperation on political 
and security matters through confidence-building, “preventive diplomacy,” 
and constructive dialogue with ASEAN political partners.124  (Participants to 
the ARF include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, 
European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Korea (ROK), Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New 
                                                 
122 Leszek Buszynski, ‘Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War Era:  Regionalism 
and Security’ (1992) Asian Survey, Volume 32, No. 9, 830-847.  See Nicholas 
Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia:  To Foster the Political Will (Routledge, 
United Kingdom, 2006). 
123 See Paul J. Davidson, ASEAN:  The Evolving legal Framework for Economic 
Cooperation (Times Academic Press, Singapore, 2002); ASEAN Law Association, 
ASEAN Legal Systems (Butterworths Asia, 1995); Alan Khee-jin Tan, ‘Recent 
Institutional Developments on the Environment in Southeast Asia – A Report Card on 
the Region’ (2002) Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 6, 891-908. 
124 See ARF overview at 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx (last visited 20 
August 2007). 
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Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Viet Nam.)   
Issues foremost on the ARF’s agenda are nuclear non-proliferation,125 
counter-terrorism, territorial disputes,126 and transnational crime.127  Finally, 
consistent with the “ASEAN Vision 2020” (which articulates member States’ 
long-term objectives for the ASEAN)128 regional cooperation is facilitated 
through three “communities:” the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN 
Economic Community (which provides the venue for cooperation and 
dialogue in relation to the ASEAN Free Trade Area),129 and the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community.   
After over forty years as an association for regional cooperation, 
ASEAN is poised to move towards greater regional integration, this time as a 
formal international organization with the ability to make decisions binding 
and enforceable upon all ASEAN member States.  On November 20, 2007, all 
ten (10) ASEAN countries signed the Singapore Declaration on the ASEAN 
Charter, stating their resolve to “complete ratification by all Member 
Countries as soon as possible in order to bring the ASEAN Charter into 
force”.130   
The signing of the Singapore Declaration followed swiftly after the 
ASEAN countries issued the 13 January 2007 Cebu Declaration on the 
                                                 
125 See Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 27 
November 1971.   
Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm (last visited 18 August 2007); 
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, Thailand, 15 
December 1995.  Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/2082.htm (last visited 18 
August 2007). 
126 See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, 4 November 2002. 
127 See overview of ARF history and developments at 
http://www.aseansec.org/92.htm (last visited 18 August 2007). 
128 Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (last visited 18 August 2007). 
129 See Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15 December 1988.  Full text at:  
http://www.aseansec.org/687.htm (last visited 18 August 2007); Agreement on the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992.  Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/1164.htm 
(last visited 18 August 2007); Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Thailand, 15 December 1995.  Full text 
at:  http://www.aseansec.org/2083.htm (last visited 18 August 2007). 
130 Singapore Declaration on the ASEAN Charter, 20 November 2007. 
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Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, noting that “ASEAN has matured into a 
regional organisation and is expanding its role as an integrated regional 
economy and a dynamic force in maintaining regional peace and stability as 
envisaged in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II  (Bali Concord II) and its 
plans of action, roadmaps, and the ASEAN Vision 2020 which envisions 
ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in 
peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in  partnership in dynamic 
development and in a community of caring societies.”131  The move from 
regional cooperation to integration appears to have been largely motivated by 
Southeast Asia’s economic development over the last forty years within the 
framework of ASEAN cooperation.   
As of April 2008, total ASEAN population stands at over 575 million, 
with an annual population growth of almost 2%.  Overall GDP for the 
ASEAN region is now about US $1.3 trillion per annum, under a 6.5% growth 
rate per annum. Total annual inter-ASEAN trade is at over US $354 billion 
per annum, with a 14.7% growth rate in nominal value of total trade. Total 
annual ASEAN trade with non-ASEAN countries (including other regional 
economic groupings) is nearly US$ 1.1 trillion per annum, accounting for 
74.9% of ASEAN countries’ total trade volumes.132  To date, seven (7) out of 
the ten (10) ASEAN countries have completed their respective domestic 
ratification processes on the ASEAN Charter: Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  The ASEAN Charter will enter into 
force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the tenth instrument 
of ratification with the ASEAN Secretary-General.133   
At the time of its creation, ASEAN’s international legal personality 
was thus “relative” or “subjective”,134 being attributable to the express 
recognition of its member States under the framework of the TAC and the 
Bangkok Declaration.  ASEAN actions under its cooperative framework are 
generally undertaken through a consensus-building process, which has 
subjected ASEAN to international observers’ criticisms of organizational 
impotence against human rights violations of ASEAN member countries, 
most recently Myanmar.  Against these criticisms, however, ASEAN has 
stood by its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘preventive diplomacy’ 
                                                 
131 Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, 13 January 2007.   
132Latest macroeconomic indicators from http://www.aseansec.org (last visited 28 
May 2008). 
133 ASEAN Charter, Chapter XIII, Article 47(4). 
134 CASANOVAS, ORIOL.  UNITY AND PLURALISM IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW.  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), at pp. 124-125. 
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to encourage members to embrace democratic principles and widen 
democratic spaces.135   
The signing and ongoing ratification process of the ASEAN Charter 
institutionalizes ASEAN’s Vision 2020.  In 1997, ASEAN member countries 
anchored ASEAN Vision 2020 on two (2) platforms:  1) closer economic 
integration with the free flow of goods, capital, services, and investments 
among ASEAN countries; and 2) an increasingly unified ASEAN identity 
under institutions that promote ASEAN regional political, social, and security 
interests towards compliance with the international legal order.136  Pursuant to 
this vision, ASEAN leaders resolved in 2003 to facilitate creation of the 
ASEAN Community through three “pillar communities”:  the ASEAN 
Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community (which provides the 
venue for cooperation and dialogue in relation to the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area),137 and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.   
The ASEAN Charter, however, marks a distinct culmination of the 
forty-year cooperative relationship between the ASEAN member countries.  
As stressed by Philippine Ambassador Rosario Manalo, the Chairperson of 
the High-Level Task Group that drafted the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN would 
be transformed from a regional cooperation to a “rules-based organization 
with legal personality”, which could “sue and be sued”.138  Briefly, the 
important features of the ASEAN Charter are the following: 
• Conferral of Legal Personality on ASEAN;139 
                                                 
135 “ASEAN to Pursue Constructive Engagement With Myanmar after Power 
Struggle”, October 25, 2004, at http://www.aseansec.org/afp/78.htm (last visited 28 
May 2008). 
136 Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (last visited 18 August 2007). 
137 Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15 December 1988.  Full text at:  
http://www.aseansec.org/687.htm (last visited 18 August 2007); Agreement on the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992.  Full text at:  http://www.aseansec.org/1164.htm 
(last visited 18 August 2007); Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Thailand, 15 December 1995.  Full text 
at:  http://www.aseansec.org/2083.htm (last visited 18 August 2007). 
138 “Draft ASEAN Charter calls for human rights body, upholds noninterference 
policy”, The Associated Press, November 8, 2007, at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/09/asia/AS-GEN-ASEAN-Charter.php  (last 
visited 28 May 2008). 
139 ASEAN Charter, Chapter II, Article 3. 
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• Expansion of Organizational Purposes to include Strengthening 
Democracy, Promoting Rule of Law, and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;140  
• General Obligation of ASEAN member States to abide by 
Organizational Principles such as “adherence to the rule of law, 
good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional 
government”, as well as “respect for fundamental freedoms, the 
promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of 
social justice”;141 
• General Obligation of ASEAN member States to abide by 
Organizational Principles that affirm adherence to rules of the 
international legal order, such as “the United Nations Charter and 
international law, including international humanitarian law”, the 
principle of non-intervention, and all multilateral trade rules, 
emphasizing “respect for the different cultures, languages, and 
religions of peoples of the ASEAN” given their “common values 
in the spirit of unity in diversity”;142 
• Organizational structure and institutions with the following key 
powers and functions: 
1. ASEAN Summit143 (composed of the Heads of State of the 
Member States), which functions as the “supreme policy-
making body of ASEAN”, with powers to “deliberate, 
provide policy guidance and take decisions on key issues 
pertaining to the realization of ASEAN objectives”, including 
“taking appropriate actions” in “emergency situations”.  
While decision-making remains primarily based on 
consultation and consensus, if consensus cannot be achieved, 
the ASEAN Summit may “decide how a specific decision can 
be made”.  The ASEAN Summit shall also decide over 
serious breaches of the ASEAN Charter. 
2. ASEAN Coordinating Council144 (composed of Foreign 
Ministers of the Member States), which coordinates the 
implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN 
Summit. 
                                                 
140 ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1(7). 
141 ASEAN Charter, Chapter 1, Articles 2(2h) and 2(2i). 
142 ASEAN Charter, Chapter 1, Articles 2(2j), 2(2k), 2(2l), 2(2m), 2(2n). 
143 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 7, and Chapter VII, Article 20. 
144 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 8. 
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3. ASEAN Community Councils145 (composed of the ASEAN 
Political –Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic 
Community Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community Council), which continues the work of the 
ASEAN pillar communities and submits recommendations 
and reports to the ASEAN Summit for decision. 
4. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, the ASEAN Secretary-
General, the ASEAN Secretariat, Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, National Secretariats, and the ASEAN 
Foundation,146 which collectively coordinate report gathering 
throughout ASEAN’s operational functions, for formulation 
of recommendations for ASEAN policy making. 
5. ASEAN Human Rights Body,147 an institution established in 
‘conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN 
Charter relating to the protection and promotion of human 
rights’, and whose terms of reference are still to be 
determined at the next ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
• Specific Obligations of ASEAN Member States to “take all 
necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate 
domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of 
the Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership”, 
and to peacefully resolve and settle disputes pursuant to the 
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms, without prejudice to 
future recourse to dispute settlement mechanisms to which 
ASEAN Member States are parties.148 
The passage of the ASEAN Charter (and its ongoing ratification 
process) signals three important developments for the integration of the 
Southeast Asian region:   
1. a region-wide commitment to international law, or the rules of the 
international public order;  
2. institutional and Member-State accountability as a platform for 
compliance; and  
3. respect for political pluralism under a common conception of 
shared values.   
                                                 
145 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 9. 
146 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 15. 
147 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 14. 
148 ASEAN Charter, Chapter III, Article 5(2), Chapter VIII, Articles 23-28. 
2008] DIANE A. DESIERTO 427 
 
 
When all ASEAN member countries signed the ASEAN Charter 
without qualification, they likewise undertook not to take any action that 
would ‘defeat the object and purposes’ of the Charter.149  ASEAN Member 
States whose ratification of the ASEAN Charter remains pending (e.g. the 
Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia) should therefore be seen as just 
as bound as other Member States who have ratified the Charter (e.g. 
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia) to observe the key 
ASEAN Organizational Purposes of ‘strengthening democracy, promoting 
rule of law, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’, along 
with the United Nations Charter, international law, international humanitarian 
law.  
This region-wide commitment builds on a forty-year history of 
independent practice and/or opinio juris on universal human rights norms by 
Southeast Asian states.  The majority, if not all of its member States, have in 
recent years either signed, ratified, or acceded to the fundamental treaties and 
conventions codifying the ‘core’ human rights norms on civil and political 
rights and the jus cogens prohibitions against torture, crimes against 
humanity, slavery, genocide, racial discrimination, and other egregious human 
rights violations.150  Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, have 
already ratified the Apartheid Convention.  All ASEAN member States have 
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).  Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam 
have all ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD).  Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Vietnam have likewise ratified the Genocide Convention.  The ICCPR 
has been ratified by Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.   
In the last decade, the Torture Convention has been ratified by 
Indonesia and the Philippines.   The strong cultural relativist positions of 
some ASEAN Member States (such as Singapore and Malaysia in 1993 
during the Vienna Conference on Human Rights) could thus be deemed to 
have been rendered obsolete by the ASEAN Member States’ own practice 
(albeit imperfect), treaty ratification record, and the passage of the ASEAN 
Charter.  Indeed, even the Vienna Declaration which explicitly rejected 
                                                 
149 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18(1). 
150 See http://www.unhcr.org (last visited 18 August 2007) for the status of 
ASEAN member states’ signatures, ratifications, accessions to the ‘core’ human 
rights treaties on civil and political rights. 
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cultural exceptionalism to observance of human rights, was passed with the 
affirmative votes of the very same Asian states that registered cultural 
relativist objections.151  The same degree of commitment extends to abiding 
by multilateral trading rules.   
Prior to the passage of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Member States 
had to conduct their own national review, analysis, and monitoring to 
ascertain compliance with the rules of origin and the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, with no legally binding authority to 
resolve disputes among ASEAN members.152  ASEAN members have agreed 
to uniformly impose zero tariffs on generally all imports between ASEAN 
members by 2010 (2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam).  With 
the signing of the ASEAN Charter, all Member States have assumed the 
obligation not to defeat its purposes, one of which is adherence to multilateral 
trading rules.  This implies that ASEAN Member States’ national 
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area rules (pending entry into 
force of the ASEAN Charter and the activation of its institutions of 
governance) should still strictly comply with all multilateral trading rules.  
There should be little doubt that ASEAN and its Member States are bound 
and committed to the rules of international public order.  Exceptionalist 
positions have been substantially eroded with the signing (and impending 
entry into force) of the ASEAN Charter. 
The crux of international criticism against ASEAN prior to the 
passage of the ASEAN Charter was its organizational ‘ineffectiveness’ due to 
the consensus-requirement for decision-making.  ASEAN’s “silences” and 
“omissions” in recognition and enforcement of international human rights 
norms on civil and political rights have been attributed to the difficulty of 
achieving a consensus, and ASEAN’s strong emphasis on the fundamental 
                                                 
151 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23.  Full text at:  http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/vienna.htm (last 
visited 23 August 2007); UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 
Articles 2, 4, and 5. 
152 Under the CEPT scheme, the ASEAN Free Trade Area does not apply a 
common external tariff on imported goods.  ASEAN members can apply a tariff rate 
of 0 to 5 percent on goods originating within ASEAN, while they can impose tariffs 
based on their national schedules for goods entering outside of ASEAN.  Exclusions 
from the CEPT scheme are optional upon ASEAN members for temporary 
exclusions, sensitive agricultural products, and some general exceptions. See 
http://www.aseansec.org (last visited 28 May 2008). 
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principles of sovereignty and non-interference.153  The ASEAN Charter 
departs from ASEAN’s present voluntarist model of international personality 
by expressly conferring ASEAN with “legal personality” as an “inter-
governmental organization”,154 and enjoying functional immunities and 
privileges “necessary for the fulfilment of [the] purposes”155 of the 
organization.   
The hortatory provisions in the Preamble of the ASEAN Charter 
widen ASEAN’s orientation from political-economic cooperation towards 
“adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.156  Thus, while the ASEAN Charter affirms the fundamental 
principles in the TAC, the Bangkok Declaration, and other treaties, 
declarations, agreements, and international instruments annexed to the 
Charter, the ASEAN Charter introduces a novel clause by making “respect for 
fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the 
promotion of social justice”,157 and “adherence to the rule of law, good 
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government”158 
key principles to govern the conduct of ASEAN and its member States.   
In relation to these broader purposes and principles of conduct, 
member States are expressly obligated to “take all necessary measures to 
effectively comply with all obligations, including the enactment of 
appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of 
this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.”159  Most 
importantly, the ASEAN Charter appears to dilute the consensus requirement 
in decision-making.  While the Charter states that “[a]s a basic principle, 
decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus”,160 
the failure to achieve a consensus will vest the ASEAN Summit with the 
                                                 
153 Thio, Li-ann.  “Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries:  ‘Promises 
to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep”, 2 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1 (1999). 
154 ASEAN Charter, Chapter II (Legal Personality), Article 3. 
155 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 17.  Chapter VI, Article 19(2) also 
provides that “the conditions of immunities and privileges of the Permanent 
Representatives and officials on ASEAN duties shall be governed by the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations or in accordance with the national law of the 
ASEAN State concerned.” 
156 Preamble to the ASEAN Charter, Seventh Clause. 
157 ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(i). 
158 ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(h). 
159 ASEAN Charter, Chapter III (Membership), Article 5(2) 
160 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII (Decision-Making), Article 20(1). 
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authority to “decide how a specific decision can be made”, a mechanism by 
which the ASEAN Summit can opt out of the consensus requirement on a 
case to case basis.161   
It would appear, therefore, that the “new” ASEAN contemplated in 
the ASEAN Charter bears an “objective” legal personality since the 
organization’s existence arises from the satisfaction of international legal 
requirements for ‘organizationhood’:   
1. the possession of the organization’s own “distinct will” apart 
from that of its members, evidenced by the organization’s power 
to take binding decisions upon the entire membership through the 
vote of a mere majority of its members;  
2. the presence of organs bearing special tasks, defining the position 
of members in relation to the Organization; and  
3. the grant of legal capacity, privileges, and immunities to the 
Organization in the territory of each of its member States.162   
ASEAN’s acquisition of an “objective” legal personality under the 
ASEAN Charter (in addition to its “relative” or “subjective” legal personality 
conferred by its membership under the present framework of the TAC and the 
Bangkok Declaration) has implications for its responsibility as an 
international organization, and for the ‘residuary’ responsibility of its member 
States, to third parties.  If ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter were to be 
viewed as a “distinct legal entity from its member-states”, it would be difficult 
to attribute responsibility per se to its Member States for acts ascribed to or 
authored by ASEAN.  However, if Member States’ residuary responsibility to 
third parties is to be affirmed even under the ‘new’ ASEAN, the process will 
likely take the shape of either: 1) “secondary member-state responsibility”, 
where the third party must first present its claim to ASEAN, and recourse to 
the Member States would be had only if ASEAN is in default in providing an 
adequate remedy; or 2) “indirect responsibility”, where Member States are 
deemed a priori responsible to the organization to meet its obligations 
towards third parties.163   
                                                 
161 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 20(2). 
162 KLABBERS, JAN.  AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Cambridge University Press, 2002), at pp. 54 57.  See also 
Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 178-179, and 185. 
163 KLABBERS, at pp. 311-312. 
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 In any event, while institutional change does not guarantee 
international compliance, what is deeply significant for the Southeast Asian 
region is its Member-States commitment to accountability.  After over forty 
(40) years of (generally) informal and non-binding cooperative measures and 
voluntarist actions and initiatives by ASEAN member-States, the commitment 
to institutional and membership accountability under the ASEAN Charter is 
still a positive step towards achieving regional compliance with international 
law. 
 
 
